The Daily Show:

Award-winning journalist Patrick McGee joins Jon Stewart to discuss how Apple built China in his new book Apple in China: The Capture of the World’s Greatest Company. They talk about Apple “sleepwalking” into this crisis, building a competitive market in Xi Jinping’s authoritarian state, the vocational training that boosted rivals, how Trump’s attempted Apple boycott backfired, and whether investments may be facilitating the annexation of Taiwan.

Terrific interview. I’m a few chapters into the book, and it’s good. McGee’s a good writer and a serious reporter — the depth of his research shows. It feels not like a few stories padded out to book length, but instead the distillation of a complex story that demands an entire book to tell.

Barry Ritholtz, in an excerpt from his brand-new book, How Not to Invest, marking the occasion of the 24th anniversary of Cliff Edwards’s claim chowder hall of famer, predicting doom for Apple’s then-new foray into its own chain of retail stores:

There are many genuinely revolutionary products and services that, when they come along, change everything. Pick your favorite: the iPod and iPhone, Tesla Model S, Netflix streaming, Amazon Prime, AI, perhaps even Bitcoin. Radical products break the mold; their difference and unfamiliarity challenge us. We (mostly) cannot foretell the impact of true innovation. Then, once it’s a wild success, we have a hard time recalling how life was before that product existed.

The Apple Store was clearly one of those game-changers: By 2020, Apple had opened over 500 stores in 25 countries. They are among the top-tier retailers and the fastest to reach a billion dollars in annual sales. They achieved the highest sales per square foot in 2012 among all retailers. By 2017, they were generating $5,546 per square foot in revenues, twice the dollar amount of Tiffany’s, their closest competitor. Apple no longer breaks out the specifics of its stores in its quarterly reports, but estimates of store revenue are about $2.4 billion per month.

May 2001 is so long ago, Daring Fireball hadn’t yet launched. So I can’t say I predicted the success of Apple’s retail stores. But what I recall thinking, at the time, was that it might work, and was definitely worth trying. Here’s the nut of Edwards’s 2001 piece:

Since PC retailing gross margins are normally 10% or less, Apple would have to sell $12 million a year per store to pay for the space. Gateway does about $8 million annually at each of its Country Stores. Then there’s the cost of construction, hiring experienced staff. “I give them two years before they’re turning out the lights on a very painful and expensive mistake,” says Goldstein. [...]

What’s more, Apple’s retail thrust could be one step forward, two steps back in terms of getting Macs in front of customers. Since most Mac fans already know where to buy, much of the sales from Apple’s stores could come out of the hides of existing Mac dealers. That would bring its already damaged relations with partners to new lows. In early 1999, Best Buy Co. dropped the iMac line after refusing a Jobs edict that it stock all eight colors. Sears, Roebuck & Co. late last year dumped Apple, sources say, after concluding that sales were too hit or miss. And in recent weeks, Mac-only chains such as The Computer Store and ComputerWare have closed down, citing weak margins. Now, faced with competition from Apple, others may cut back. “When you choose to compete with your retailers, clearly that’s not a comfortable situation,” says CompUSA Chief Operating Officer Lawrence N. Mondry.

Two decades later, talking about the importance of Sears as a retail partner looks pretty dumb. But to me, the obvious problem with this argument in 2001 is that if Apple’s existing retail partners in 2001 were doing an even vaguely good job, why was the Mac’s market share so low? At the time they were only a handful of years past the crisis where the company almost went bankrupt. Apple, in the old days, had some fantastic small mom-and-pop official retailers, but they were small. And the big partners, like CompUSA, absolutely sucked at showcasing the Mac. Their demo machines were frequently broken.

If you understood and believed that the Mac was a superior product, it was easy to conclude that its relatively low market share must have been a function of problems with its marketing and retail strategy. Gateway’s fundamental problem had nothing to do with the fact that it was running its own retail stores — it was that they were selling shitty computers. Apple was selling great computers, but had shitty retail partners.

(I’m a longtime fan of Ritholtz’s writing; I’ve got a copy of How Not to Invest — here’s a make-me-rich Bookshop.org link — and it’s next on my reading list after I finish Patrick McGee’s Apple in China.)

No details on what yet, but a lovely little 9-minute video on why.

Sam Altman:

“What it means to use technology can change in a profound way. I hope we can bring some of the delight, wonder and creative spirit that I first felt using an Apple Computer 30 years ago.”

Jony Ive:

“I have a growing sense that everything I have learned over the last 30 years has led me to this moment. While I am both anxious and excited about the responsibility of the substantial work ahead, I am so grateful for the opportunity to be part of such an important collaboration. The values and vision of Sam and the teams at OpenAI and io are a rare inspiration.”

I am not a fan of the lowercase styling of “io”, but otherwise shoot this into my veins. This industry needs a heavy dose of new ideas for new devices. This is just a vibes teaser, but the vibe is a shot across the bow. It conveys grand ambition, but without pretension. To say I’m keen to get my hands on what they’re making is an understatement.

Chance Miller, 9to5Mac:

After a nearly five-year hiatus, Fortnite is back on the App Store for iPhone and iPad users in the United States. Epic Games announced the return of the battle royale gaming app this afternoon, and you can head to the App Store now to download it.

Son of a bitch Epic did it. This was like a double bank shot.

It was smart for Apple to just concede here. Pick your battles is a cliché but it’s a great truism. Even if Apple’s executives still wanted to keep Fortnite out of the App Store, even if they still think they’d win, ultimately, in court, why fight over this? I think they would win, but probably not with Judge Gonzales Rogers, so they’d be looking at a protracted series of appeals. Why bother?

Also, fascinatingly, neither Apple nor anyone from Apple has commented on this whole thing at any point. Epic published the letter their attorneys received from Apple’s attorneys, which I’m sure Apple fully expected, but Apple itself has never said a word about Epic’s submission of Fortnite to the US App Store.

The craziest thing about this entire saga is that Apple won the original lawsuit on 9/10 or 10/11 points, depending on how you count them. The only point they lost on was the anti-steering nonsense — not allowing apps to link out to the web for purchases, or even tell users about offers available on the web. That was the only point they lost on, and it was the one thing Apple has been most clearly wrong about all along.

All Apple had to do was allow apps to link out to the web, which clearly should have been allowed since forever ago — link-outs were the antitrust/competition escape valve — and they’d have swept the entire Epic lawsuit, and it would have been over four years ago.

Taegan Goddard:

When Sen. Maggie Hassan (D-NH) asked Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem for the definition of “habeas corpus,” Noem incorrectly described it as a right that the President of the United States has to deport people.

You can go the Latin route (“produce the body”) or the English common-law route (the accused have a right to be shown the evidence against them and defend themselves in court). Noem went the “biggest clown of the clown-car Trump 2.0 administration” route.